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The New Anti-Dumping Procedures of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Does It
Create a New Non-Tariff Trade
Barrier?
The Trade Agreements Acts of 19791 contains what is likely to be
the most extensive modification of U.S. anti-dumping law since the

passage of the original Antidumping Act of 1921.2 The new law makes
five significant changes in anti-dumping investigation procedures
which are intended to streamline investigations, to provide prompter
and more effective relief for domestic industries threatened by unfair

foreign competition, and to provide the agencies with a clearer definition of their responsibilities.3
These worthy intentions, however, have produced a system that is

unfairly burdensome to foreign manufacturers and domestic importers:4 the shortened time limits may result in inaccurate and prejudicial
1 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections of 13, 19, 26, 28
U.S.C.). The Act became effective on January 1, 1980. Before it could become effective, the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT had to become effective. Id at § 107. This was done when President Carter signed the
Memorandum of December 15, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 74, 781 (1979).
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was designed to implement the liberalized multilateral
measures negotiated by the participants in the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1478 (President Carter's message
upon submission of the Trade Agreements Act to Congress for passage); DEP'T STAT BULL., Aug.
1979, at 43.
2 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976)). Most of the important
procedural amendments to the Antidumping Act of 1921 were made by the Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5-8, 15, 19, 21-22, 26, 42,
45 U.S.C.).
For ease of drafting, the new law completely revokes all prior legislation and then reenacts
some provisions in essentially the same form. Pub. L. No. 96-39, supra note 1, at § 106.
3 See Implementation of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: HearingsBefore the SubcomL
on InternationalTrade ofthe Senate FinanceComm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Senate MTN Hearings];MultilateralTrade Negotiations: HearingsBefore Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as House
MTN Hearings]; The Trade Agreements Act of 1979. HearingsBefore the Subcomna on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm. on S. 1376, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Trade Act Hearings];Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Administration Hearings].
4 Some witnesses at the subcommittee hearings on the new Act suggested that in the midst of
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findings;5 the new price assurance provisions are unnecessarily harsh
and limit the opportunities for a quick termination of an anti-dumping
investigation;6 the new disclosure rules threaten the competitive secrets
of foreign producers;7 the cash deposit of estimated dumping duties
punishes dumpers unnecessarily; 8 and the new procedure for retroac-

tive duty assessment unjustifiably imposes greater risks upon the
dumping defendant.9 By unfairly burdening foreign manufacturers

and domestic importers, the new law creates a barrier to foreign trade
and thus harms both the United States and its trading partners. 10

Because these new procedures are the result of a basic misconception of the purposes of anti-dumping law, this comment first will briefly
examine the effects of dumping and anti-dumping legislation in light of
a free trade policy. Second, it will outline the procedures utilized prior

to the 1979 Act to establish the sequence of an anti-dumping investigation. Next, in order to clearly indicate how the old law has been
changed, the five new procedures adopted by the new Act will be de-

scribed. Finally, this comment will scrutinize these changes in order to
demonstrate how they discourage imports and thus erect a barrier to

trade.
A

BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY UNDERLYING

ANTI-DUMPING LAW

The benefits of a free trade policy are theoretically based on what

economists refer to as comparative advantage. The principle of comparative advantage states that because of natural advantages, such as

low labor costs, abundant raw materials, or technical expertise, each
country will be better off if it specializes in producing those goods it can

make, relatively, the most cheaply, and then trades for the other goods
it requires." When there are barriers to trade, a country must divert
the debate on the new procedures, some domestic groups took advantage of congressional confusion over the purposes of anti-dumping law to introduce a number of protectionist measures. See
House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 745 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
5 See notes 111-137 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 138-157 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 158-168 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 169-189 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 190-198 and accompanying text infra.
10 For a general discussion of past use of antidumping law as a barrier to trade, see Barcelo,
4ntidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade, 57 CORNELL L. REV.491 (1972); Schwartz, The 4dministration by the Department of Treasury of the Laws Authorizing the Imposition of Antidumping Duties, 14 VA. J. IT'L L. 463 (1974); Weeks, Introduction to the Antidumping Law: A Form of
Protectionfor theAmerican Manufacturer, 35 ALB. L. REV.182 (1971); Note, U.S. Protectionismin
International Trade, 61 Ky. L.J. 935 (1972).
11 For a more detailed discussion of comparative advantage theory and its benefits, see G.
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resources to the production of necessary goods that other countries
could have produced more cheaply, thereby diminishing the wealth of
that country.I2 A barrier to trade consists of any practice that prohibits
trade, such as an embargo, or that merely discourages trade, such as
that
tariffs, quality requirements, or more pertinently, legal procedures
3
impose undue costs and uncertainties upon foreign producers.'
Broadly defined, dumping occurs when a foreign manufacturer exports goods to be sold in the United States at a lower price than that to
be charged in his own domestic market. 4 The 1979 Act defines dumping as sales of foreign goods at less than their fair value.' 5

Because markets consist of many sales at many different prices, the
new Act employs a number of theoretical aggregates-United States
price, foreign market value, constructed value, and third country
price-to determine when sales at less than fair value (LTFV) are being

made. 16
Hypothetically, a foreign producer may decide to dump when he

sells in two or more markets, and faces a different elasticity of demand
in each market.' 7 Empirically, although there are a variety of reasons,
HABERLER, A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY (1961); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
668-691 (9th ed. 1973); W. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL

POLICY, 65-73 (1977); Barcelo, supra note 10, at 498.
12 See, e.g., Smith, Restraintson ForeignImports, in READINGS IN ECONOMICS 335 (P. Samuelson, R. Bishop & J. Coleman eds. 1952).
13 Besides tariffs, barriers to trade "include such traditional obstacles as import quotas and
unduly complicated customs procedures which tendto hinder internationalmobility ofmerchandise.
They also include export subsidies, government procurement policies, and standards set for consumer or user protection." Marks & Malmgren, NegotiatingNontarigDistortionsto Trade, 7 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 328 (1975) (emphasis added).
14 Technically, dumping occurs whenever a manufacturer sells at a different price in a foreign
market than in his own, ie., a manufacturer may "dump" in his own country. W. WARES, supra
note 11, at 3-7.
15 Pub. L. No. 96-39, supra note 1, at § 731(1).
16 "United States price" is either the price at which the merchandise is agreed to be sold or the
actual sale price in the U.S., each with the appropriate adjustments. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat.
144, § 772(a) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a). "Foreign market value" is the ordinary
wholesale price of the goods in the producer country. Id at § 733 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673(b). "Constructed value" is used in place of foreign market value under certain circumstances, and based on cost of production and normal profit rates in the producer country. Id at
§ 733(e). "Third market value" is also used at times in place of foreign market value and is based
on sales in countries other than the United States or the producer country. Id at § 733(a)(I)(B).
See generally Note, TreasuryRuns the Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinationsunder the Antidumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 919 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GA. Note].
17 See W. WARES, supra note 11, at 10, 31. Elasticity of demand refers to the slope of the
demand curve. An elastic demand means that as the price of a good changes, the number of
consumers willing to purchase that good changes greatly; an inelastic demand means that as the
price of a good changes, the number of consuimers willing to buy that good changes relatively
little. Id
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dumping often arises when the foreign manufacturer seeks to maintain
full production, either because of economies of scale or strong domestic
competition, but produces more than his limited, perhaps relatively
poorer domestic market can absorb.' 8
Dumping can have both beneficial and harmful effects. The foreign manufacturer benefits from increased sales, greater market dominance, and higher profits. 19 Dumping also benefits the American
consumer who buys the cheaper, dumped goods,20 although the foreign
consumer may be harmed, because he faces a higher price than he
would otherwise.21 American producers may be harmed by the increased competition from the lower-priced imports. It is this sort of
harm to American producers that anti-dumping law seeks to prevent. 2
Three types of dumping may be distinguished-price discrimination per se, injurious dumping, and predatory dumping-and each type
is not equally objectionable.2 3 Price discrimination24 per se is not illegal under U.S. anti-dumping law; dumping that does not injure domestic industry actually may have beneficial effects: "improved efficiency
in the allocation of productive resources through time, innovative vigor
in the production process, and distribution of products to the consumer
at lowest possible prices."' 25 Even injurious dumping is justifiable if it
arises from comparative advantage, and harms only inefficient or noncompetitive domestic producers whose resources could better be used
elsewhere.26 Injurious dumping, however, has long been the overriding
concern of domestic unions, manufacturers, and suppliers,27 and, as did
the prior law, the 1979 Act prohibits any dumping that causes injury to
a domestic industry, regardless of the industry's efficiency or ability to
18 Id. at 7-12. See also J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 23

(1923).
19 W. WARES, rupra note 11, at 7-12.

20 Id at 59-88.
21 Id at 27-54.
22 Id

23 Price discrimination per se "causes only minimal business injury to domestic competitors."
Barcelo, supra note 10, at 499. Injurious dumping "causes recognizable and perhaps significant
business injury in the form of lost sales and lower profits, but of a type normally associated with
ordinary price competition.... ." Id Predatory dumping "includes dumping practices which by
design or in effect cause such pervasive injury to domestic competition as to threaten monopolization." Id
24 Price discrimination is merely the charging of different prices in different markets. W.
WARES, supra note 11, at 88-9.
25 Barcelo, supra note 10, at 500.
26 Id
27 See, eg., AdministrationHearings, supra note 3, at 114-15 (statement of Robert Cornog,
Chairman, Comm. of Domestic Steel Wire Rope and Specialty Cable Mfrs.).
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compete with foreign producers.28 Predatory dumping, as an extreme
form of injurious dumping, is also prohibited.29
The remedies for injurious and predatory dumping are "remedial"
in nature, that is, essentially prophylactic and not punitive. 30 The law
is designed merely to force cessation of dumping so that domestic and
foreign producers may compete on a fair and equitable basis.3 1 Therefore, any aspect of the law which extends further and prevents noninjurious dumping or punishes the foreign manufacturer for injurious
dumping will exceed the intent of anti-dumping law and will unnecessarily discourage imports.
PAST PROCEDURE UNDER THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF
AND THE TRADE ACT OF 1974

1921

Although a district director of the Customs Service could begin an
investigation on his own initiative,3 2 this rarely happened 33 under the
prior statutory scheme.34 Generally, an investigation began when a
complaint was submitted by a representative of the domestic industry
whose market was allegedly being threatened. 35 This complaint had to
contain certain information: a description of the goods in question,
and sufficient price and injury data to indicate, first, that sales were
28 The injury standard has been raised by the new Act to "material injury." Pub. L. No. 9639, 93 Stat. 144, § 731 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
29 See Barcelo, supra note 10, at 499.
30 "The intent of Congress was not to impose a penalty, but an amount of duty sufficient to
equalize competitive conditions." R. STURM, A MANUAL OF CUSTOMS LAW 134 (1976) (citing
Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961); C.J. Tower & Sons v.
United States, 71 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1934); Kleberg & Co., Inc. v. United States, 71 F.2d 332
(C.C.P.A. 1933)). See also Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1400 (Cust. Ct.
1971).
31 In this respect anti-dumping law resembles the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a), 21(a) (1976). It seems that this purpose could be better effectuated, however, if the law
concentrated on predatory dumping alone. See note 23 supra.
32 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.25 (1979).
33 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 465. In 1978, a new feature, the trigger price mechanism, was
added to Treasury Department procedures in an effort to improve the ability of the Customs
Service to detect possible dumping, but it was rarely employed. Seegenerally Kantor, The Trigger
Price Mechanism." Limitation on Administrative Discretion under the Antidumping Laws, 11 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 443 (1978); Comment, Effective Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Laws: The
Development and Legal Implicationsof Trigger Pricing,13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433 (1979); Note,
Effective Enforcement of U.S Antidumping Laws. The Development andegallmplicationsof Trigger Pricing, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 969 (1978); Note, Trigger Prices- A Shot in the Dark?, 18
VA. J. INT'L L. 771 (1978).
34 For a detailed discussion of past antidumping procedures, see E. ROSSID.S, U.S. CUSTOMS,
TARIFF AND TRADE 423-53 (1977); U.S. CUSTOMS DEP'T CUSTOMS ANTIDUMPING HANDBOOK
(1978); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 464-67.
35 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.26 (1979).
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being made at less than fair value (LTFV) and, second, that the industry was being injured by these LTFV sales.36 If the complaint was inadequate in these respects, it was returned to the complainant.37
If the complaint was adequate, the Treasury Department then undertook an initial thirty-day inquiry.38 If the Secretary of the Treasury
determined that the complaint could not be substantiated or that further investigation was unwarranted, he would terminate the investigation.39 If the Secretary found that there was "a substantial doubt" that
the domestic industry was being injured, he would refer the complaint
to the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).4 ° The
ITC then would have thirty days to determine either that there was "no
reasonable indication" of injury as defined in the Act,4 1 in which case it
would terminate the investigation; or that a "reasonable indication" did
exist, in which case the full-scale Treasury investigation would continue.4 2

If the investigation continued, the Secretary had a number of duties: he was required to publish an anti-dumping proceedings notice in
the Federal Register;43 to request pricing information from foreign
manufacturers and domestic importers;' to verify the information by
traveling to the exporting county, if necessary;45 and to hold a series of
disclosure conferences in which "interested parties"-usually the domestic producers-could inspect the non-confidential submissions and
suggest further avenues of inquiry.4 6 Commercially sensitive information submitted by foreign producers, such as trade secrets, production
and distribution costs or customer lists, could be designated confidential and therefore made available only in summary form to the inter36 19 C.F.R. § 153.27 (1979).
37 Id at § 153.28.
38 Id at § 153.29. See generally McDermid & Foster, T7he U.S. InternationalTrade Commissions,30-Day Inquiry Under the 4nt/dumping 4c!: Section 210(c)(2), 27 MERCER L. REV. 657
(1976).
The Treasury Department was originally assigned responsibility for both the LTFV and the
injury determinations, but the responsibility for injury determination was transferred to the
United States Tariff Commission by the Act of September 1, 1954, 68 Stat. 1138, § 301 (1954).
The Tariff Commission was renamed the United States International Trade Commission by the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 321(a)(1) (1974).
39 19 C.F.R. § 153.29(a) (1979).
40 Id at § 153.29(b).

41 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (1976).
42 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.29(b), 207.2-.3 (1979).
43 19 C.F.R. § 153.30 (1979).

44 Id at § 153.31(b).
45 Id at § 153.31(a).
46 Id at §§ 153.31(c)-(d).
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ested parties. 7
Six months after the publication of the anti-dumping proceedings
notice, or nine months in complicated cases, the Secretary was required
to make a tentative determination.4 8 He had to decide either: (1) to
discontinue the investigation on the basis of "price assurances" received from the foreign exporters or because of other reasons; 49 (2) to
make a finding of no sales at LTFV;50 or (3) to make a finding of LTFV
sales and thus immediately withhold appraisement.5 Notice of the
tentative determination had to be published in the Federal Register. 2
Withholding of appraisement meant that the determination of duties on goods arriving from overseas or on goods withdrawn from U.S.
Customs warehouses would be postponed until the end of the withholding period and that these goods could not enter the U.S. market
unless an appropriate bond was filed.5 3 Appraisement would be withheld for three months unless a six-month withholding period was requested by one of the parties. 4 Although appraisement was generally
withheld only on goods entered for determination of duties after the
date of the tentative determination, the Treasury Department, at its discretion, could retroactively include any imports that had entered the
United States up to 120 days before the initiation 5of the investigation
and had not yet been released to the U.S. market.
After the tentative determination was made, an oral hearing on the
matter was then conducted, if requested by one of the parties, and an
opportunity for written submissions was provided for the manufacturers and importers involved. 6 Then, within three months of the notice
of tentative determination, or six months if the extension on the withholding period had been granted, the Secretary made a final determination. The Secretary could: (1) discontinue the investigation,
47 Id at §§ 153.22-.23.
48 Id at § 153.32.
49 Id at § 153.33. Price assurances, also known as price undertakings, are simply agreements
between the agency and the foreign exporters to raise the price of the exports so as to eliminate the
margin of dumping, le., the difference between the sale price in the United States and the fair
market value. Id.

50 Id at § 153.34(a).
51 Id at §§ 153.35, 153.37.
52 Id at §§ 153.33(b), 153.34(a), 153.37(b).
53 E. RoSSIDES, supra note 34, at 442. If the final determination is affirmative, then dumping
duties will be assessed upon all goods on which appraisement was withheld. Id
54 19 C.F.R. § 153.35 (1979). The six-month period was requested and obtained in about 95%
of the cases. This allowed the parties more time to develop arguments and confer. E. RosSIDES,
supra note 34, at 442.
55 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.35(d) (1979).
56 19 C.F.R. § 153.40 (1979).
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accepting the offered price assurances and implementing the appropriate monitoring mechanism;5 7 (2) terminate the investigation with a
final finding of no sales at LTFV;5 8 or (3) make an affirmative finding,
in which case he would withhold appraisement on the imports, if he
had not already done so. 5 9 If appraisement was withheld, the Secretary
was also required to publish a complete statement of reasons and findings consistent with the confidentiality regulations and to refer the investigation to the ITC.6 0
Upon referral from the Treasury, the ITC published notice of its
investigation.6 1 The ITC then sought written submissions from the
62
parties, and if the ITC deemed it worthwhile, it held a public hearing.
Within three months a determination was made either that the domestic industry was not being injured by the dumping and the proceeding
63
was terminated, or that the industry was indeed being injured. If injury was discovered, this finding was communicated to the Treasury
Department. 64
Upon an affirmative finding from the ITC, the Secretary would
publish a dumping finding in the Federal Register and request the Customs Service to begin assessing dumping duties. 6 5 Release of the goods
to the domestic market would still be conditioned upon the filing of an
adequate bond. 6 The Customs Service would then prepare master lists
of the different makes and models of the dumped goods and proceed to
assess duties on a case-by-case basis.6 7
PROCEDURAL CHANGES ENACTED BY THE TRADE AGREEMENTS

ACT OF 1979

Five of the most important changes in anti-dumping procedure
contained in the new Act are: (1) shortened time limits for dumping
determinations; (2) complex and extensive new provisions governing
57 Id at §§ 153.33(c), (f). If the foreign exporter chose to raise prices, then a statement of the
agreement had to be received at the Treasury and periodic reports were required. Id at
§ 153.33(c). If the exporter chose to leave the U.S. market instead, he could not re-enter for five

years. Id at § 153.33(i).
58
59
60
61

Id
Id
id
id

at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§

153.34(c).
153.38.
153.41.
207.4(b).

62 Id at §§ 207.4(c)-(d).
63 Id

at § 207.4(e).

64Id
65 Id at § 153.43.
66 Id. at §§ 153.50-.51.
67 Id at § 153.57.
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the use of price undertakings or assurances; (3) liberalized rules for disclosure of confidential information; (4) the new availability of cash deposits of estimated dumping duties as a provisional remedy; and (5) the

retroactive application of dumping duties under "critical circumstances."
Shortened Time Limitsfor Dumping Determinations
There are three stages in an anti-dumping investigation: the initial

inquiry, the preliminary determination, and the final determination.
The 1979 Act allocates less time for each of these phases than did prior

legislation.
In the initial inquiry, the Department of Commerce 68 now has
only twenty days after the initiation of an investigation to test the suffi-

ciency of the allegations of the dumping complaint instead of the thirty

days that the Treasury Department had under the old scheme. 69 Furthermore, the ITC has only forty-five days after the initiation of an
investigation to decide whether there is a "reasonable indication" of
injury, while previously the ITC had another thirty days after the matter was referred from the Treasury.7 °
The preliminary determination stage has been abridged from
seven months to 160 days. 7 1 As before, more time may be sought to
investigate complicated cases; the time limit may be extended to 210
days if the Commerce Department finds that "novel issues" or numerous transactions are involved.72 Regardless of the complexity of the
68 The 1979 Act made one change that is incidental to the main discussion of this paper, and is
yet very important. Because of wide dissatisfaction with inadequate enforcement, arbitrary decisions, and long delays in investigation and assessment of duties, Congress removed the responsibility for LTFV investigation from the Treasury Department and vested that responsibility with
an unspecified "administering authority," leaving the assignment of functions to the President.
Many critics felt that the Treasury's enforcement and diplomatic responsibilities conflicted. 1979
Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 40, 73; Kantor, supra note 33, at 448.
In his Reorganization Plan No. 3, President Carter transferred the responsibility for enforcement and LTFV determination to the Commerce Department, and placed the responsibility for all
overarching policy decisions with the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
15 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1476, reprintedin44 Fed. Reg. 69,273
(1979). After the time for congressional objection passed, the plan became effective. 44 Fed. Reg.
74,781 (1979).
69 The complaint must make the same allegations and supply the same information as under
the prior legislation. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 732(c)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a). See also note 42 and accompanying text supra.
70 In the peculiar bureaucratic double negative, the ITC does not determine that there is no
reasonable likelihood of material injury. Pub. L. No. 93-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(a) (1979) (to be
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b). See also Acrylic Sheet from Japan, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,509 (1975).
71 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(b)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
72 Id at § 733(c)(I)(B) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
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case, however, the time limit may be extended if the petitioner makes a
timely request.73
A new feature of the law allows a drastic contraction of the preliminary determination stage. Seventy-five days after the initiation of the
investigation, the petitioner and all other interested parties are offered
an opportunity to waive the verification process, and to proceed to a
determination on the evidence submitted by the foreign manufacturers
prior to that time.74
The final determination phase has been shortened from the original nine months to seventy-five days. 7" An extension of up to 135 days
may be sought by the foreign manufacturer if the preliminary determination is affirmative or by the petitioner if the preliminary determination is negative. 76 This contrasts with the six-month extension
available under the prior legislation. The ITC now has only 120 days
after the preliminary determination by the Commerce Department in
which to make its final determination, although if the LTFV investigation is extended, the ITC has until the forty-fifth day after the final
determination by the Commerce Department to complete its investigation.77
New Codffed Procedureson Acceptance of PriceAssurances

Previously, the Treasury Department had broad discretion to negotiate, accept, and monitor undertakings or agreements.78 In contrast,
the new Act creates a complex mechanism to regulate the use of agreements and undertakings.
An investigation may be terminated at any time if the petitioner
simply withdraws his petition. 79 An investigation also may be suspended if those foreign exporters who account for "substantially all" of
the imports in question agree to stop dumping.8 " The exporters may
agree to cease all exports within six months, or they may agree to a
price assurance or undertaking under which they will adjust their prices
so as to eliminate the dumping margins.81 If a price undertaking is
agreed upon, the amount of future imports by the foreign parties may
73 Id

at § 733(c)(1)(A).
74 Id at § 733(b)(2).

75 Id at § 735(a)(1) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d).
76 Id at § 735(a)(2).

77
78
79
80

Id at § 735(b).
See notes 141-143 and accompanying text infra.
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 734(a) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
Id at § 734(b).

81 Id
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the amount imported over the "most recent representative
not exceed
82
period."
If the Commerce Department determines that "extraordinary circumstances" are present, however, then the agreement must demonstrate that it will eliminate all injurious effects resulting from LTFV
sales before it can be accepted. 83 Under extraordinary circumstances,
import entries will be examined on an entry-by-entry basis by the Customs Service to assure that the agreement is being observed. 4 Circumstances are considered extraordinary if "novel issues" or numerous
transactions or parties are involved."'
There are five prerequisites to the acceptance of a price undertaking. First, the agreement must be "in the public interest."8 Second,
those producers who account for "substantially all" of the imports at
issue must all agree to the undertaking.8 7 Third, the Customs Service
must implement an effective monitoring system for the agreement. 88
Fourth, the Commerce Department must give notice of the agreement
and provide interested parties with a chance to comment on and, if
necessary, to seek judicial review of the terms of the undertaking.8 9 Finally, the suspension of the investigation must be accompanied by an
affirmative preliminary determination of dumping.9" This determination does not result in the application of provisional remedies, such as
withholding of appraisement, or, as it is termed in the new Act, suspension of liquidation, 9 unless the agreement is breached. In the case of a
breach, liquidation is immediately suspended, that is, appraisement is
withheld and the investigation is resumed at the point of interruption.9 2
Intentional violations of a price undertaking, although they are difficult
to prove, may be subject to further civil sanctions.9 3
If any interested party94 desires a determination as to wh,,.her
82 Id at § 734(d)(2).
83 Id at § 734(c).
84 Id.
85 Id at § 734(c)(2).
86 Id at § 734(d)(1)(A).
87 Id at § 734(b).
88 Id at § 734(d)(1)(B).
89 Id at § 734(e).
90 Id at § 734(f)(1)(A).
91 Id at § 733(d)(1) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
92 Id at § 734(i)(1)(A) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
93 Id at § 734(i)(2).
94 An "interested party" is defined by the 1979 Act to be either a foreign exporter, the government of that exporter, a domestic manufacturer, a trade association representing manufacturers,
or a union whose members are employed in the industry. Id at § 771(9) (to be codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677).
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dumping indeed has occurred, however, it may request that the investigation continue, despite the agreement.9 5 Then, if the final determination is negative, the undertaking or agreement is no longer binding; if
affirmative, the determination will not be given effect unless there has
been a violation of the agreement.9 6 If there is a breach after such an
final determination of dumping, duties are assessed immeaffirmative
97
diately.
New LiberalizedRulesfor Disclosureof ConfidentialInformation
Prior to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, all disclosure rules
were promulgated by the agencies, rather than enacted by Congress.98
The new Act incorporates those rules to a large extent. Nonconfidential information from foreign manufacturers and summaries of confidential information remain available to interested parties, 99 and
disclosure meetings are still exparte, although a record of each meeting
must now be kept by the investigating agency. 1°°
Unlike the prior regulations, however, the new Act additionally
allows the release of confidential information under a protective order
to representatives of interested parties.10 1 If a request for such a release
is denied by the agency, the party may appeal the decision to the Customs Court. 10 2 To prevent possible competitive injury to foreign manor the court may enforce the
ufacturers, however, either the agency
10 3
citations.
contempt
through
order
Cash Deposit of Estimated Dumping Duties as a ProvisionalRemedy
Under the previous statutory scheme, an affirmative preliminary
or final determination would cause the appraisement of foreign imports
to be withheld. These goods would be released to the U.S. market,
however, if the importer secured the amount of possible duties with a
bond.10 4 Under the new Act, upon an affirmative determination, liquidation is suspended, and either a bond or a cash deposit for the full
amount of the estimated dumping duties, as the Customs Service deems
95
96

97
98

99
100
101
102

Id at § 734(g) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c).
Id at § 734(f)(3).
Id
See 19 C.F.R. at §§ 153.22-.23 (1979).
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 777(a)(4) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 16770.
Id at § 777(a)(3).
Id at § 777(a).
Id

103 Id
104 See

notes 53 and accompanying text supra.
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05
appropriate, must secure each import entry.'

Retroactive Application of Dumping Duties Under "Critical
Circumstances"
Prior legislation conferred upon the Treasury Department the discretion to assess dumping duties retroactively for a period up to 120
days prior to the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation.' 6 Under
the new law, a petitioner may seek retroactive application by making a
timely allegation of "critical circumstances."'0 7 Circumstances are critical if there has been a history of dumping in the industry or if there
has been intentional dumping, and if, in either case, there has been
massive dumping over a brief period of time.'0 8 If such an allegation
has been made, the Commerce Department and the ITC must decide at
the time of the final determination whether critical circumstances exist.'0 9 If so, then all goods entered for appraisement in the ninety days
prior to the date of the suspension of liquidation, in addition to goods
entered after that date, will be withheld for assessment of dumping duties. "o
CRITICISM OF THE

NEw

ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES CONTAINED IN

THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF

1979

A foreign manufacturer who faces a dumping complaint must decide whether to defend against the complaint or to discontinue exporting; a foreign manufacturer who confronts the possibility of a dumping
complaint must decide whether he will risk a proceeding or, instead,
change his pricing policy, perhaps choosing not to export at all. In a
variety of ways, the five major procedural changes introduced by the
new Act add to the cost and the uncertainty of an anti-dumping investigation and, thus, will have a discouraging effect on some foreign exporters.
Shortened Time Limitsfor Dumping Determinations
In prescribing any time limits for anti-dumping investigations,
105 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(d)(3) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
106 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(B) (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 153.35(d) (1979).
107 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 733(e) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b). The

allegation may be made at any time up to 20 days before the final determination by the Commerce
Department. Id
108 Id at § 733(e)(1)(A). "Hit-and-run" or "sporadic" dumping usually involves only a few
shipments within a short time. Barcelo, supra note 10, at 508.
109 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, §§ 735(a)(3), (b)(4) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d).
110 Id at § 733(e)(2) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b).
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there is a trade-off between the interest in granting early relief to domestic producers and the interest in making an accurate and fair finding.1 1' The Antidumping Act of 1921 placed no time limits on
12
investigations, with the result that substantial delays were common.'
This occasionally worked hardship on domestic industries beleaguered

by predatory pricing. One extreme example is the case of Television
Receiversfrom Japan,113 in which several years passed between the ini-

tiation of the investigation and the effective enforcement of the dumping determination." 4 As a result of the delay, several domestic
television manufacturers went out of business." 5 In response to this
Trade Act of 1974,116 set time limits for the varicase, Congress, in the
11 7
ous determinations.

The further contraction of time limits in the 1979 Act is the result
of a continuing, but now unnecessary congressional reaction to past lax

enforcement by the Treasury Department." 8 Backlogs in dumping
duty assessment will be effectively eliminated by the new time limits on
assessment;" 9 the time limits enacted by the 1974 Act have been adequate to prevent the sort of delays that occurred in Television Receivers
from Japan.120 The new provisions only marginally hasten relief-by a

month and a half, at most-while they make it much more difficult to
collect useful data necessary to an accurate determination of dump21

ing.1

111 See 1979 TradeAct Hearings,supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
112 See Senate MTN Hearings,supra note 3, at 208-09 (statement of John Nevin, Chairman,
Zenith Radio Corporation).
113 36 Fed. Reg. 4597 (1971) (imposing antidumping duties).
114 The history of Television Receivers from Japan, id, began with the filing of the complaint
in March, 1968. In December, 1970, the Treasury Department notified the ITC of a determination
of LTFV sales. In March 1971, the ITC found that over half of the 15 or 16 domestic television
producers then in business had suffered losses. A dumping finding was entered and the Customs
Department assessed about one million dollars in duties between March 1971 and March 1972.
Assessment was then discontinued without explanation. In 1976, the ITC sought to reinvestigate,
but was denied access to the files. In March 1978, the Justice Department received evidence of
kickbacks and double pricing in the Japanese TV import business. The Customs Department then
discovered that its figures were totally inaccurate and attempted to assess 400 million dollars in
past duties. Treasury subsequently sought to settle for about 50 million dollars, and the deadline
for the settlement was extended at least three times over a four-month period. SenateM'TNHearings, supra note 3, at 207-09 (statement of John Nevin, Chairman, Zenith Radio Corporation).
115 Id
116 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5-8, 15, 19, 21-22,
26, 42, 45 U.S.C).
117 Id at § 321(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)).
118 See House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 102 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
119 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 736(c)(1) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673e).
120 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.32, .33(c), .33(f), .41, 207.4(e).
121 See House MfTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 102 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
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The shorter time limits impede effective data collection in a
number of ways. First, some initial investigatory decisions, such as the
use of constructed value' 2 in place of foreign market value in the
LTFV determination, are based upon the character of the initial submissions.12 3 These decisions determine the subsequent thrust of the investigation, and a hasty, erroneous decision would be difficult to correct

later. The use of an inappropriate valuation, for instance, would inaccurately reflect the fair values of the goods at issue and may lead to an

improper determination of dumping; a change to the correct valuation
would require collection and verification of completely new data within
the remaining statutory period.1 24
Second, the briefer time periods affect data collection during the

course of the investigation. Generally, the investigating agency first
drafts a questionnaire seeking the information it believes will be impor-

tant. 125 To verify the evidence obtained in response to those questionnaires, representatives of the agency may need to travel to the
exporter's country.'2 6 In subsequent disclosure conferences, domestic
27
producers will indicate what additional information will be needed.'
The consequence of shortened time limits is that there will be less time

to draft adequate questionnaires, less time for thorough verification,
and less time for a helpful series of disclosure conferences.

28

In this

connection, it is interesting to note that an examination of anti-dumping cases prosecuted under the previous schedule revealed that in almost every case the agencies utilized the entire statutory period for
each determination.

129

122 See note 16 supra.
123 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 773 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b). The
decision to use constructed value or third country value depends on the amount of product sales
made in the producer country, and the similarity of the goods in the producer country with the
exported goods. See GA. Note, note 16 supra.
124 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 746-47 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail
Cumins).
125 E. RoSSIDES, supra note 34, at 448.
126 Id
127 Id

128 1979 TradeAct Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
129 In a study of 33 cases initiated and completed between January 1, 1975 and January 1, 1978,
the initial inquiry was completed within 21 days in only four cases: Capacitors from Japan, 40
Fed. Reg. 48,702 (1975); Digital Automatic Scales from Japan, 41 Fed. Reg. 43,746 (1976); Pressure Sensitive Plastic Tape from West Germany, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,521-22 (1976); and Ice Hockey
Sticks from Finland, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,345 (1977). In only one case was the preliminary investigation completed in as little as five months, and in that case the determination was negative. Tires
from Canada, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,869 (1975). On the other hand, in fourteen cases the times for the
preliminary determination was extended, in all but two cases for the statutory maximum of nine
months. See, e.g., Metal Walled Swimming Pools from Japan, 42 Fed. Reg. 17,558 (1976); Ski
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In two ways, then, the agencies may be unable to collect useful or
sufficient information on which to base a decision. As a result, the
agency will prefer to err on the side of domestic protection and provisional remedies. The Commerce Department and the ITC may make a
greater number of affirmative preliminary determinations that will be
reversed by the final determinations; 130 the agencies may even make
affirmative final determinations in cases where there actually has been
no dumping. 13 1 Unwarranted assessments of dumping duties would
have a serious impact upon the pricing decisions of foreign exporters,
for even a temporary suspension of liquidation may be harmful be32
cause it could drive marginally successful companies out of business.1
One rationale for the shorter time limits is that they would make it
more difficult for an exporter who is aware of a dumping investigation
1 33
to quickly finish his dumping before the suspension of liquidation.
There is empirical evidence, however, that foreign exporters take such
action only in the most exceptional cases. 134 Certainly such action
would tend to make the dumping more obvious, to the detriment of the
exporter.
Although the problem of shortened time limits may be ameliorated by more substantial budgets of anti-dumping enforcement, the
35
agencies have not been guaranteed larger future appropriations.
Furthermore, the speed of an anti-dumping investigation depends to
some extent on factors beyond the agency's control: the foreign manufacturer must cope with questions in a foreign language; he must supply data of a kind often not retained or compiled in the requested
format; and the goods themselves may be produced in numerous models or with unique characteristics, each of which must be distindo
guished. 136 Even a huge increase in funding, facilities, and staff will
37
investigation.1
the
of
aspects
these
of
little to hasten completion
Bindings from Austria, Switzerland, West Germany, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,847-48 (1975); Automobiles
from Belgium, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, West Germany, 40 Fed.

Reg. 33,755-58 (1975).
130 Senate MATN Hearings,supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp
& Beatly Corp.).
131 Id

132 House MTN hearings, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of William Eberly, Representative,
American Chamber of Commerce).
133 Id
134 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271 (report of the Comptroller of the United

States).
135 Senate MTN Hearings,supra note 3, at 301 (statement of Ferroalloys Assoc.).
136 Id at 40-41 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp & Bealy Corp.); 1979 Trade
Act Hearings,supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
137 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 40-41 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
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New Codfed Procedureson Acceptance of PriceAssurances
Price assurances are an appropriate remedy for dumping because
the anti-dumping law is essentially a remedial statute and its purpose is
served by voluntary elimination of dumping margins.' 38 For domestic
producers, price assurances generally provide relief more quickly than
the provisional remedies which accompany an affirmative preliminary
or final determination of dumping.' 3 9 For the foreign manufacturers,
price assurances provide greater certainty in commercial transactions
and obviate the need for a costly defense and submissions of confidential information. 4 °
Despite the fact that the Antidumping Act of 1921 contained no
provision for price assurances, such agreements evidently were liberally
used until the mid-1970's.14a At that time, domestic producers, through
their congressmen, greatly criticized the Treasury Department for accepting agreements that were considered too advantageous to foreign
producers and for insufficiently monitoring subsequent compliance." 2
In response, the Treasury Department adopted a very restrictive policy;
was
assurances were no longer accepted unless the margin of dumping
43
imports.
all
of
average
weighted
a
of
percent
one
less than
The new Act contains no such mathematical restrictions. Nevertheless, the same sort of criticisms as those previously directed to the
Treasury Department seem to have guided the drafting of the section of
price assurances."' The complicated new provisions are likely to restrict the usefulness of price assurances in several ways.
First, investigations can be continued merely upon the request of
an interested party, such as a domestic manufacturer or a union whose
members are employed in the industry. 4 Thus, a foreign competitor
may be harassed by an expensive investigation even after the reason for
Kemp & Beatly Corp.); 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
138 House MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 33-4 (statement of Charles Carlisle, Representative,
Ad Hoc American Subsidies Coalition); Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 159-160 (statement of John Rehm, Special Counsel, Senate Finance Committee).
139 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 482.
140 Id
141 See Johnson, Retroactive Application of the AntidumpingAct of 1921, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 262, 264-65 n.10 (1979). Since 1975, there have been only two discontinuances of investigation although 16% of all past complaints were disposed of through price assurances. Id
142 See Barcelo, supra note 10, at 543; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 481.
143 T.D. 70-127, 4 CusToMs BULL. 293 (1970). See also Barcelo, supra note 10, at 543;
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 481.
144 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
145 See note 94 supra.
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the proceeding has ceased to exist. 146 The opportunity to continue the
investigation greatly reduces the incentive to agree to a price undertaking.
Second, the penalty for violators of price assurances seems unduly
punitive. 147 Upon acceptance of a price assurance, an affirmative preliminary determination is automatically made. If the undertaking is
subsequently violated, liquidation is immediately suspended.1 48 Foreign exporters often agree to a price assurance simply because they find
it easier to raise prices than to defend against a dumping complaint. 149
If that agreement is violated, however, the foreign exporters face a
three-month suspension of liquidation even though the original investigation might have led to a negative determination. Moreover, the violation may be inadvertant or circumstances may have changed to the
point where the breach is harmless. 5 The civil sanctions imposed on
the Act,
intentional violators are also contrary to the remedial nature of
1 51
although these provisions may be unenforceable in practice.
Third, the wording of the 1979 statute requires all of those producers, who account for "substantially all" of the imports at issue, to agree
to the undertaking before it may become effective. 5 2 In the case of a
large number of producers, each possessing a small share of the import
market, disagreement and dissension could make an agreement impossible to reach. 153 In the case of a small number of producers, each controlling a large share of the market, the provisions may require
unanimity.' 5 4 It is unlikely, however, that an exporter's counsel will
recommend participation in the undertaking if there is a good chance
55
that a negative determination will be made concerning his client.'
Fourth, suspension of the investigation must be "in the public interest."' 156 This provision might be interpreted to require periodic reevaluations of the undertaking so that as costs and prices inflate, the
provisions of the undertaking are altered. This re-evaluation would be
146 1979 TradeAct Hearings,supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
147 Id
148 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra.
149 .4dministrationHearings, supra note 3, at 232 (statement of William Barringer).
150 Id

151 See 1979 TradeAct Hearings,supra note 3, at 707 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
152 See note 88 and accompanying text supra. "Substantially all" is likely to mean no less than

85% of the imports in question. 1979 Trade Act Hearings,supra note 3, at 708 (statement of Noel
Hemmendinger).
153 Id
154 Id
155 Id

156 See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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157
equivalent to administering prices on those imports.

New DisclosureProvisionsfor ConfidentialSubmissions

The new disclosure provisions are designed to improve the ability

of agency personnel to acquire and verify information.1 5

Disclosure

conferences with representatives of domestic industry provide an important and independent check of the accuracy and relevance of submissions from foreign manufacturers. 59 Under the prior rules,
however, it was difficult to verify confidential information because domestic parties could not examine it in its original form, and summaries
of such information were often meaningless.1 60 Thus, under the new
rules, even confidential information is subject to critical examination.
These new provisions, however, will also have a discouraging effect on foreign trade. First, the new rules will impose "psychic costs"
on the foreign producers.' 6 1 Disclosure of highly sensitive confidential
information to domestic rivals would adversely affect the competitiveness of foreign manufacturers. 162 Thus, confidential information will
not be disclosed to shareholders or employees of the domestic producers, but only to counsel and then only for the purposes of the investigation. 163 The availability of civil and criminal contempt penalties may
be insufficient to prevent minor or inadvertent disclosures due to the
difficulty of detection. 6" Those foreign manufacturers who feel their
confidential information is sufficiently important may choose to discontinue imports altogether rather than risk disclosure. Other manufacturers may attempt to delay or avoid disclosing sensitive matters or try to
submit the bare minimum requested. 165 For lack of certain information, the agencies will be forced to make more arbitrary determinations.
Second, it seems that a meaningful review of the facts both prior to
the decisions to issue a protective order and on appeal will increase the
157
158
159
160

House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of Richard Cunningham).
Id at 110-11 (statement of Charles Verrill, President, AMF, Inc.).
See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 470.
House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 110-11 (statement of Charles Verrill, President,

AMF, Inc.).
Id at 746.
162 Id

161

163 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 makes confidential information available under a protective order. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 777(c)(I)(B) (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f). The protective order shall contain those requirments that the administering agencies
shall deem appropriate. Id The ITC has made confidential information available only to independent attorneys representing the domestic parties. 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458, 76,470 (1979).
164 House MTN Hearings,supra note 3, at 746 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
165 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 706 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
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cost of anti-dumping investigation for the foreign producers. 166 Before
information is disclosed it is likely that some minimum showing of
need will be required.'67 This will precipitate more litigation and
parties attempt to defend the confidentiality
greater costs as the foreign
68
of their submissions. 1

Cash Deposit of EstimatedDumping Duties as a ProvisionalRemedy

Upon the suspension of liquidation, the Commerce Department
has the option of compelling the cash deposit of estimated duties as
security for those duties that might later be assessed. 169 The intent of
Congress was to provide better protection for domestic industry over
the period before final duty assessment. 170 The new provisions may be
another legacy of Television Receiversfrom Japan and the inadequate

prior administration of the anti-dumping law. 17 1 As will be demonstrated below, the new measure is an improper solution to past
problems for it is contrary to the remedial nature of anti-dumping law.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the previous use of bonding to secure
future duties failed to provided the needed protection.
Deposit of estimated dumping duties is a punitive measure for a
number of reasons. First, after a dumping finding has been made, the
importer generally will raise his prices to eliminate the dumping margins. 172 In this way, the importer retains the extra income on each sale,
rather than losing it to the U.S. government as a dumping duty. 173 This
does not subvert the Act; instead, the dumping margin is eliminated
and the remedial purpose of the law is fulfilled. 174 An example of such
a result is Elemental Sulphurfrom Mexico, 175 in which the dumping
margin was found to be seventy-three percent, but the actual assessment on the goods amounted to only about three percent.' 76 Although
any excess assessment would eventually be refunded to the import166 House MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 110 (statement of Charles Verrill).
167 See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458 (1979) (new ITC regulations).
168 House MTNHearings, supra note 3, at 746 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
169 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
170 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 57-58 (statement of William Anderson, Dep'y
Director, Gen'l Gov't Position, GAO).
171 House MTNHearings, supranote 3, at 747 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins);
Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 239.
172 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,

Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
173 Id
174 Id

175 37 Fed. Reg. 2793 (1972).
176 1979 TradeAct Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,

Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
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ers,' 7 7 the new provision requires the importer to carry a dual burden:
during the period before final assessment, he must pay for past dumping while simultaneously raising his present prices.178 This dual burden is not only punitive, 79but it may also force many marginal
1
businesses into insolvency.
Second, the provisional duties are estimated on the basis of the
LTFV margins elicited in the investigation, and these LTFV margins
are a poor basis for estimating duties. The LTFV determination is
based on a historical period and does not reflect subsequent changes in
the prices of foreign and domestic goods.'
Furthermore, the LTFV
margin is an aggregate value, derived from sampling the entire batch of
goods at issue, and it is arbitrary to apply this valuation to goods upon
which a duty eventually will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 18 1 It is
also true that the LTFV determinations are less exacting and rigorous
than the margin determinations made at the assessment stage. 8 2 In
fact, errors, in LTFV determinations of five and ten percent are com3
8

mon. 1

Third, it has not been conclusively shown that bonding fails to
adequately protect domestic industry. While it is true that, in the past,
bonds usually covered only a fraction of the duties owing, the Customs
Service has reported that few, if any, duties have been lost as a result of
inadequate bonding. 184 In any event, most importers immediately raise
their prices after a dumping finding, thus providing all the protection
that anti-dumping law seeks.'8 5
Bonding has also been criticized because it allows the foreign manufacturer the use of the duties owing during the period of assessment, 8 6 and it further allows him to pay the duties in inflated
177 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 778 (1979) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 167 7g).
178 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 492 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.).
179 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President, Kemp
& Bealy Corp.).
180 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 189 (statement of American Importers Association).
181 House MTN Hearings,supra note 3, at 218 (statement of Richard Maxwell, Vice President,
American Importers Association).
182 Senate AMTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Noel Hemmendinger).
183 Id
184 Senate MTNHearings,supra note 3, at 239 (statement of Peter Suchman and Gail Cumins).
The Treasury policy stated that bonding was not intended to cover the total liability, but only the
risk factor. Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of John O'Loughlin, Duty
Assessment Div., Customs Service).
185 See notes 172-76 and accompanying text supra.
186 See McDermid & Foster, supra note 38, at 658-9.
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dollars.1 87 These two points are irrelevant, however, if the primary
purose of the Act-the cessation of dumping-is achieved. Furthermore, considering the costs of investigation and the costs of bonding, it
is difficult to see how bonding is of much investment value.
Finally, the critics of bonding often observe that other countries

require the deposit of estimated dumping duties. 18 Other countries assess dumping duties in far fewer cases than does the United States, 18 9
however, and the gravity of those cases may demand a level of protection that the majority of U.S. cases do not.
RetroactiveApplication of Dumping Duties Under "Critical
Circumstances"

Although prior legislation provided for retroactive assessment of
dumping duties, the measure was discretionary and rarely invoked.190
Retroactive assessment under the 1979 Act is less discretionary: if

"critical circumstances" are proven, retroactive duties must be assessed.' 91 Moreover, at least theoretically, a negative determination of
critical circumstances is reviewable.' 92
From the standpoint of free trade, the primary concern is the
greater uncertainty that the new provision creates for the foreign manufacturer. 93 The limits of potential liability are less clear and foreign
manufacturers may hesitate to export after the initiation of investigation. 9 4 Even if the ultimate determination is negative, the added risk

of retroactive assessment may discourage imports, particularly if the
95

1
industry is one with a history of dumping.

The new provision was intended to prevent "hit-and-run" dump187 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 210 (statement of John Nevin, President, Zenith
Radio Corporation).
188 AdministrationHearings, supra note 3, at 49, 60 (statement of John O'Loughlin, Duty Assessment Div., Customs Service).
189 Senate MTN Hearings, supra note 3, at 138 (statement of AFL-CIO).
190 See 1979 Trade-4ctHearings,supra note 3, at 491 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beatly Corp.); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 482 n.38. Generally, retroactive duties were
assessed only when appraisement of the goods had been delayed for fortuitous reasons or when
the foreign exporter and the domestic importer were "related." Anthony, The American Response
to Bumpingfrom Capitalistand Socialist Economies, 54 COR ELL L. REv. 159, 193 n.127 (1968).
191 See notes 107-110 and accompanying text supra.
192 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, § 1001 (1979) (to be codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
193 1979 Trade Act Hearings, supra note 3, at 491 (statement of Lee Greenbaum, President,
Kemp & Beady Corp.).
194 Id
195 Administration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271-2 (report of the Comptroller of the United

States).
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ing 19 6 and to discourage importers from attempting to quickly complete
their dumping before the suspension of liquidation. It is far from clear,
however, that "hit-and-run" dumping is harmful,' 97 and there is evidence that importers do not try to take advantage of the lag between
19 8
the filing of a complaint and the application of provisional remedies.
Thus, the extra protection provided to domestic producers by retroactive assessment is superfluous.
CONCLUSION

Basing its perception on a few anomalous cases, Congress was dissatisfied with prior anti-dumping procedure because it believed that a
sluggish investigatory timetable and an apathetic, perhaps even complicit, exercise of discretion by the Treasury Department allowed
dumpers to evade effective censure. The new procedures were intended
to create a more potent enforcement mechanism: shortened time limits
were to provide relief to domestic industry more quickly; price assurance provisions were to prevent easy agreement between agency and
foreign producer on assurances that were, nonetheless, detrimental to
domestic industry; new disclosure measures were to facilitate more intensive investigation; cash deposit of estimated duties was to protect
domestic industry better over the period between detection of dumping
and remedy; and the critical circumstances provision was to provide an
easily ascertainable standard for application of harsher remedies.
Not only is greater domestic protection unnecessary, but by making inappropriate changes, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 unfairly
burdens foreign manufacturers and domestic importers in a variety of
ways: the shortened time limits may lead to arbitrary and prejudicial
determinations; the price assurance provisions are punitive and greatly
discourage any quick and economical resolution of a complaint; the
new disclosure rules threaten the competitive secrets of foreign producers; the cash deposit of estimated duties punishes dumpers unnecessarily; and the new critical circumstances determination engenders undue
uncertainty. By creating a more oppressive process for foreign producers, the new law may interfere with import and pricing decisions that
would normally be made under free trade conditions. This harms
196 See note 108 supra (definition of sporadic dumping).
197 "Hit-and-run" or "sporadic" dumping is "simply too brief and or haphazard to be seriously
injurious." Barcelo, supra note 10, at 508 (citing J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 30 (reprint ed. 1966)).
198 Admintration Hearings, supra note 3, at 271 (report of the Comptroller of the United
States).
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American consumers and contributes to an unjustified protection of
inefficient domestic industry.
Timothy J Patenode

